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I. INTRODUCTION
Pickering v. Board of Education,1 a foundational case in public
employment law, prominently foreshadowed the coming prominence of 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in constitutional law.  Under 
that doctrine, the Supreme Court limits a government actor, such as a 
government employer, from being able to condition governmental benefits, 
such as public employment, on the basis of individuals’ forfeiting their 
constitutional rights.  It would thus seem to follow that a public employee
should not have to sacrifice constitutionally protected rights in order to
enjoy the benefits and privileges of public employment.  Yet, today, that 
is far from the actual case.
Rather, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been applied in a 
notoriously inconsistent manner over the last forty years, and not 
just in the public employment arena.2  Indeed, for jurists, scholars, 
and practitioners alike, the doctrine continues to be one of the thorniest
issues in American constitutional law, and nowhere more so than in the
context of public employment, where since the days of Pickering, the 
meaning of unconstitutional conditions for public employees has taken
several dramatic, unpredictable, and less-than-beneficial turns.3 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in public employment has 
figured most notably in First Amendment free speech4 and freedom of 
association cases.5  In the free speech context, the Court has developed 
the Connick/Garcetti/Pickering doctrinal analysis.6  Taken together, 
1. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
2. See Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights 
in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1984) (observing that unconstitutional 
conditions decisions “manifest[] an inconsistency so marked as to make a legal realist of
almost any reader”).
3. See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 810 (2003). 
4. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006); Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671
(1994) (plurality opinion); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–85 (1987); Connick 
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140–41 (1983); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S.
410, 412–13 (1979); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 
284 (1977). 
5. See, e.g., O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 720 
(1996); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 73 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 
U.S. 507, 508 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350 (1976); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 591–92 (1967). 
6. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410; Connick, 461 U.S. 138; Pickering, 391 U.S. 563. 
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these three cases forbid public employers from taking adverse employment
action against employees for speaking out on “matters of public concern,”7 
but only if the employee is not speaking pursuant to the employee’s 
official duties,8 and then only if the employee can prevail under a
constitutional balancing test.9  Needless to say, it is quite a gauntlet a public
employee has to negotiate to succeed on a First Amendment free speech 
claim.10 
So why have First Amendment public employee speech rights, which 
have traditionally enjoyed protection under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, suddenly diminished in recent years?11 Three interrelated 
developments explain this state of affairs.  First, a jurisprudential school 
of thought termed the “subsidy school” has significantly undermined the 
vitality of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine through its largely
successful sparring with an alternative school of thought, the “penalty 
school.”  Second, although initially developed in the government-as-
sovereign context, this subsidy approach to the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine has now infiltrated the government-as-employer context and 
eviscerated large parts of the Pickering holding.  Third, and most 
significantly, the nature of the subsidy argument in the government-as-
employer context has morphed into the government speech doctrine, 
through which the government employer claims the speech of its employees
as its own and regulates it freely.  It is this last step that I refer to as the
Court’s neoformalism in handling these constitutional issues.12  Instead 
7. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143.  The Court’s attempt to define the meaning of 
“matters of public concern” in Connick has alone led to an academic cottage industry.
See Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The
Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in 
Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 102 n.82 (2006) (collecting cases that discuss 
the problems associated with the Connick “matter of public concern” test). 
8. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (“We hold that when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for 
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline.”).
9. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
10. See Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1107–11 (2008) (recounting the difficulty for public employees 
of surviving the complicated five-step free speech analysis).
11. See Mazzone, supra note 3, at 810–16 (reviewing a number of Supreme Court 
cases that establish that “[t]he doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been most 
vigorously applied in the First Amendment cases”).
12. This Article does not claim any connection with any other former use of the 
word neoformalism in the constitutional, contract, or commercial law literature.  See,
e.g., John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM
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of merely applying a legal principle in a mechanistic or categorical
manner, this new form of formalism concerns itself more with the formal
ability of individuals to exercise constitutional rights, though practical 
realities may strongly suggest that current realities may significantly
interfere with such rights.  It is this neoformalism that explains how the 
once-vital doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has come under attack
and the long-buried right-privilege distinction in constitutional law has 
reemerged. 
In order to more concretely illustrate the genesis of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine and its recent distortions, this Article conducts an in-
depth exploration of the case that started it all: Pickering v. Board of 
Education.13 Although the Court decided this case in Marvin Pickering’s
favor,14 the resulting framework has, over the years, been interpreted by 
the Supreme Court in a manner that significantly limits public employee 
free speech rights.  In fact, this same unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
has been utilized in the government-as-sovereign context to dilute other 
constitutional rights of citizens.15  What was once developed to shut the
door on the infamous right-privilege distinction16 has now been increasingly 
used to rob individuals of First Amendment and other constitutional
rights.  Indeed, when one also considers the neoformalist use of the
government speech doctrine, the civil liberties of public employees in
this area of law may be at an all-time low. 
This Article is divided into seven Parts.  Part II defines and
explores the development of the neoformalist approach by a group of 
conservative Justices.  Part III then delves into the story behind the
dispute that led eventually to the Supreme Court’s landmark penalty case 
of Pickering v. Board of Education, which established a robust form of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public employee free speech
L. REV. 869, 891 (2002) (discussing methods for discerning business agreements and
obligations); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare 
Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
155, 159 (2006) (using the term to describe a revival of formalist ideas in debating the 
role of precedent in constitutional adjudication); William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in
a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 971, 1004 (2001) (examining the effect that 
formal rules proposed in contract scholarship would have on the diverse and complex
real world of contracts). Neoformalism, as used herein, means simply a new type of
formalist thought that has helped to revive the right-privilege distinction in public 
employment law.
13. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563. 
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See infra Part IV. 
16. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege 
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445–58 (1968) (discussing
various means by which the U.S. Supreme Court has mitigated the “harsh consequences
of the right-privilege distinction”).
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cases.  Part IV then relates how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
first came under attack in the government-as-sovereign context through
the increasing use of the subsidy line of argument by conservative
Justices in these cases.  Next, Part V describes the infiltration of the 
subsidy argument into the government-as-employer context post-Pickering
and how the penalty version of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
has been distorted by this emerging neoformalism.  Part VI illustrates 
how this neoformalist conception of First Amendment rights has made 
the government less transparent and accountable because public employees 
are no longer secure in speaking their minds about their public employment. 
Consequently, it argues for the restoration of Pickering, its constitutional
balancing standards, and the penalty version of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.  Only when government actions that practically
truncate the constitutional rights of public employees are not tolerated
will public employees be able to again assume the role of the vanguard 
of the citizenry, protecting fellow citizens from government fraud, waste, 
and abuse. 
II. NEOFORMALISM AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
As noted above, the Supreme Court limits a government actor from 
conditioning governmental benefits based on individuals’ forfeiting their 
constitutional rights under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.17 
Yet, through the recent ascendancy of the government speech doctrine in
combination with the embrace of the subsidy version of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have largely
eviscerated the protection against government implementation of
unconstitutional conditions in distributing government largesse.
In this regard, these Courts have adopted a new version of formalism,
or neoformalism, to achieve these ends.  Conceptually, neoformalism 
refers to those legal theorists and judges who look for their societal ideal 
in what has come before: “rooted in the past—la terre et les morts—as 
maintained by German historicists or French theocrats, or neo-
Conservatives in English-speaking countries.”18  However, whereas more
17. See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional 
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2001).  But see id. at 9 (criticizing
the common definition of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as not being very
useful). 
 18. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in  THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND:
AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS 191, 241 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 2000). 
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traditional forms of legal formalism seek to “identify . . . foundational 
principles, deduce legal rules from them, [and] then apply those
rules syllogistically to resolve individual disputes,”19 this new formalism
concerns itself with the formal ability of individuals to exercise
constitutional rights free from physical restraint, though practical realities 
may suggest significant interference with the exercise of those rights.  It
is this neoformalism that explains how the once-vital doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions has come to languish.
Take, for instance, the constitutional rights of public employees.20 
Through a number of decisions over the past four decades, the Supreme
Court has drastically cut back on the ability of public employees to 
exercise rights to speech, privacy, and equal protection.  In the First
Amendment free speech context, the dynamic can be seen most plainly.
In fact, the Court initiated a historical formalistic move in the case of
Garcetti v. Ceballos by adopting the foundational principle that public 
employees must be considered as either employees or citizens, but never
both.21  From that foundational principle, legal rules have been deduced 
such that public employees in their citizen role enjoy robust free speech
protections,22 while those acting purely as employees have absolutely no 
such rights.23 Finally, those rules are applied syllogistically in individual
cases, so that employees who engage in speech pursuant to their official
job description are automatically treated as individuals with no free
speech rights and subject to employer discipline for their expression.24 
As others and I have argued elsewhere, this type of traditional 
formalism is troubling.25  However, the neoformalism of the current
 19. Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, 
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 567 (1996). 
20. This is an exceptionally important area for the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine because “[a] common benefit bestowed by the government is employment. 
Public employment therefore represents a constant opportunity for the government to
persuade individuals to give up certain First Amendment protections in exchange for a
regular paycheck.” See Mazzone, supra note 3, at 810. 
21. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
22. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per curiam) (“[W]hen
government employees speak or write on their own time on topics unrelated to their
employment, the speech can have First Amendment protection, absent some government
justification ‘far stronger than mere speculation’ in regulating it.” (quoting United States 
v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995))). 
23. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22. 
24. Id. at 421 (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, 
and the Constitution does not insulate their communication from employer discipline.”).
25. See, e.g., Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall 
Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1174
(2007); Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of
Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 117, 123 (2008). 
912
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Court is far more insidious and may potentially have a much larger 
impact on the constitutional rights of both public employees and all
citizens.  Neoformalism’s focus is on whether individuals’ constitutional 
rights will be formally interfered with by the government’s conditioning 
benefits on individuals taking certain actions.  In other words, neoformalists
emphasize the formal opportunity that individuals have to exercise their 
constitutional rights without considering the practical realities of
whether the government benefit program in question inappropriately 
penalizes individuals for the exercise of those constitutional rights or
makes it nearly impossible to exercise those rights given their personal 
circumstances. 
Neoformalism can be seen as deriving most directly from an ongoing 
debate between two jurisprudential schools of thought about the
longstanding and cryptic unconstitutional conditions doctrine: the penalty
school and the subsidy school.  The subsidy line of thought appears to
derive from the belief that differential subsidization by the government 
is permissible as long as a formal opportunity to exercise constitutional
rights exists outside the program in another forum.26  Subsidy school
adherents, mostly conservative-oriented Justices, maintain that as long as
individuals are not formally compelled in not exercising their constitutional 
rights, the government is under no obligation to subsidize the exercise of 
those rights.  Under this subsidy version of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, in contexts as different as abortion funding to the provision of
tax exemptions to public employment, the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine has become largely toothless in recent years because government 
actors simply compel a given result by saying they are doing nothing but 
subsidizing—or not subsidizing—a right that a citizen or public employee
already has under the Constitution.27  Under these circumstances, if the
government can constitutionally induce a result through the conditioning 
26. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991) (applying the subsidy approach
in the abortion-funding context). 
27. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 407 (1984) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) (“[W]hen the Government is simply exercising its power to allocate its 
own public funds, [the Court] need only find that the condition imposed has a rational 
relationship to Congress’ purpose in providing the subsidy and that is not primarily
‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’” (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 
358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring))); Regan v. Taxation with
Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). 
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of a government benefit, it need not worry about directly compelling the
result.28 
Specifically focusing on the constitutional rights of public employees,
the subsidy Justices are in essence saying that public employment is
“subsidized” by the government and thus the government is entitled to 
say what it wishes through its government employee without worry of 
First Amendment implications.  This is the meaning of the government 
speech doctrine in its neoformalistic form, and its most troubling aspect
may be the reinvigoration of the long-ago dismissed right-privilege 
distinction in constitutional law.29 
Conversely, the penalty Justices in these same cases maintain just as 
strongly that such subsidization significantly and practically coerces
individuals with regard to their constitutional rights.30  So, under the
penalty school, traditionally adhered to by more progressive Justices,
government may not penalize individuals for exercising constitutional 
rights by withdrawing various government benefits such as tax exemptions, 
government funding, or public employment.  As Justice Brennan maintained
in one of the first of these cases over fifty years ago, “[the government
program’s] deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine them
for this speech.”31  The seminal public employee free speech case of 
Pickering v. Board of Education is a penalty case and establishes a strong 
form of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.32 
Yet, since the days of Pickering, it appears that public employees are
no longer being considered both employees and citizens.33  Under the
Connick/Garcetti/Pickering doctrinal analysis,34 public employers are 
28. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
29. Karin B. Hoppmann, Concern with Public Concern: Toward a Better
Definition of the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993, 998 (1997)
(“Under the rights/privilege approach . . . . [t]he Court reasoned that since public 
employment is a privilege granted by the government and not a right itself, the public 
employee could not, during that employment, claim absolute rights otherwise guaranteed 
a private citizen.  Therefore, freedom of speech, though established as a universal right
in the Constitution, did not apply as such for those labeled ‘employees.’”). 
30. Rust, 500 U.S. at 216 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“By suppressing medically
pertinent information and injecting a restrictive ideological message unrelated to 
considerations of maternal health, the Government places formidable obstacles in the 
path of Title X clients’ freedom of choice and thereby violates their Fifth Amendment 
rights.”). 
31. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). 
32. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
33. The Court does, however, still pay lip service to the ideal.  See, e.g., City of
San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per curiam) (“A government employee does
not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of
his or her employment.” (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06
(1967))). 
34. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138 (1983); Pickering, 391 U.S. 563. 
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only forbidden from taking adverse employment action against
employees for speaking out on “matters of public concern.”35  However, 
if the employees are speaking pursuant to their official duties, they lose
all constitutional rights in their speech.36  The Court has achieved this
reintroduction of the right-privilege distinction into the law by contending in
its more recent public employee free speech decision Garcetti v. Ceballos
that the government employer is not conditioning public employment on 
the public employees’ forfeiting their rights to speech but instead is 
merely requiring its speech—in the mouth of its employee—be used to 
promote the particular policies for which the employee was hired.37 
This Article therefore suggests that the First Amendment public
employee speech rights, which have traditionally enjoyed protection 
under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, have suddenly diminished
in recent years through the largely successful jurisprudential sparring
between the subsidy school and the penalty school.  In order to more 
concretely illustrate the genesis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
and its recent distortions by these neoformalistic trends, this Article first
conducts an in-depth exploration of the penalty case of Pickering v. 
Board of Education.38  Although the Court decided this case in Marvin
Pickering’s favor, the resulting framework has, over the years, been
interpreted by the Supreme Court in a manner that significantly limits
public employee free speech rights.  To understand its erosion in the
government-as-employer context, however, it is first necessary to
understand the growing preeminence of the subsidy school of thought in 
unconstitutional conditions cases in which the government acts in its 
sovereign capacity.  It is those principles from the sovereignty context 
that have now infiltrated the government employment context and
explain the resulting neoformalism that has taken hold there and cut
away vast amounts of constitutional protections for public employees.
In both sovereignty and employment contexts, the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, once developed to shut the door on the infamous 
right-privilege distinction, has now been resurrected to rob individuals of 
First Amendment and other constitutional rights. 
35. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 142. 
36. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
37. Id. at 421–23. 
38. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563. 
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III. PICKERING V. BOARD OF EDUCATION39 
Marvin Pickering is now an energetic and spirited septuagenarian.  In
1964, he was a recently minted high school science teacher with a strong
desire to teach students and an idealistic view on the importance of
citizen engagement in representative government. He never expected 
that his name would one day become synonymous with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s most important modern case on public employee speech rights. 
A.  The Background Events Leading to Pickering
As a young man, Pickering made his way to Illinois and did his
student teaching at Downers Grove South High School in the suburbs of
Chicago.  That experience was followed by the completion of his first
year of teaching science at Lyons Township South High School, also in 
the Chicago suburbs.
In 1959, Lockport Township Central High School hired Pickering to
teach science.40  He was twenty-three years old.  In the next five years,
he became active in community and school politics.  During that time, he
often attended the Board of Education of Township High School District 
205 (Board) meetings and became familiar with the problems the Board
was having in addressing various school-related issues, including how to
deal with a rapidly growing student population and the need to raise 
taxes to build new facilities.  By 1964, the Board and other teachers 
knew that Pickering was one who freely spoke his mind on a variety of
topics, especially when he thought some school policy was unfair.  The 
dispute between Pickering and the Board over how the latter was
spending funds on athletics rather than on school materials and teacher
salaries seemed to be just another instance of Pickering’s speaking his mind
on something about which he passionately cared. 
That dispute, however, turned out to change the constitutional landscape 
for millions of public employees in the United States.  On October 8,
1964, the Board of Education of Township High School District 205 in 
Will County, Illinois, fired teacher Marvin Pickering for writing a 
blistering editorial about the Board and Superintendent published in the 
39. Unless otherwise indicated, the underlying story in this Part is drawn from the 
following sources: Pickering, 391 U.S. 563; Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 
1967), rev’d, 391 U.S. 563; Transcript of Oral Argument, Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (No.
510); Marvin L. Pickering, Marvin L. Pickering—The Man (unpublished autobiography)
(on file with author); and E-mail from Marvin Pickering to Paul Secunda, Assoc. 
Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (Mar. 5, 2010, 7:50 CST) (on file with
author). 
40. Township High School District 205 is located in the town of Lockport, Illinois, 
near the city of Joliet, about an hour southwest of Chicago. 
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local Lockport Herald.41  The letter addressed a series of four tax 
referenda initiated and supported by the Board of Education, which 
sought to allocate tax money for a variety of school-related purposes.42 
Pickering believed that the Board and Superintendent had bungled the 
matter and that tax money was better spent on teachers’ salary, funding
for school lunches for nonathletes, and educational needs generally.
He wrote, in pertinent part, in this letter to the editor of September 24, 
1964:
Dear Editor:
I enjoyed reading the back issues of your paper which you loaned to me.
Perhaps others would enjoy reading them in order to see just how far the two 
new high schools have deviated from the original promises by the Board of 
Education. . . . 
 . . . . 
 Since there seems to be a problem getting all the facts to the voter on the twice
defeated bond issue, many letters have been written to this paper and probably
more will follow, I feel I must say something about the letters and their writers.
Many of these letters did not give the whole story.  Letters by your Board and
Administration have stated that teachers’ salaries total $1,297,746 for one year. 
Now that must have been the total payroll, otherwise the teachers would be
getting $10,000 a year.  I teach at the high school and I know this just isn’t the 
case.  However, this shows their ‘stop at nothing’ attitude.  To illustrate further,
do you know that the superintendent told the teachers, and I quote, ‘Any teacher
that opposes the referendum should be prepared for the consequences.’  I think
41. Pickering’s editorial was published on September 24, 1964, just two weeks 
prior to his firing.  Letter from Marvin Pickering to Editor, Lockport Herald (Sept. 24, 
1964) (on file with the Lockport Public Library).  As discussed below, the Illinois
Supreme Court reproduced the letter in whole in its majority opinion in Pickering.  At
the time, the Lockport Herald had 2900 subscribers.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 39. 
42. There were four such referenda involving similar issues over a three-year 
period.  In early 1961, 
the voters of the school district turned down a proposal for the issuance of 
$4,875,000 in school building bonds to erect two new schools to accommodate 
freshmen and sophomores only to feed existing Lockport Central High School, 
which was then to accommodate juniors and seniors only.  Upon defeat, this 
program was discarded. 
Pickering, 225 N.E.2d at 2.  Subsequently, later in 1961, 
the voters approved the issuance of such bonds in the amount of $5,500,000 to 
erect two new schools, one (Lockport East) to accommodate freshmen and 
sophomores only, which was to operate as a feeder school to Lockport Central, 
and the other (Lockport West) to be a full four year high school.  Existing 
Lockport Central was then to accommodate juniors and seniors only on the 
East side of the district. 
Id.  “In 1964, proposals to increase the educational and transportation tax rates were
twice defeated, on May 23 and on September 19.” Id. at 8 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
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this gets at the reason we have problems passing bond issues.  Threats take
something away; these are insults to voters in a free society.  We should try to 
sell a program on its merits, if it has any.
 . . . . 
As I see it, the bond issue is a fight between the Board of Education that is
trying to push tax-supported athletics down our throats with education, and a 
public that has mixed emotions about both of these items because they feel they
are already paying enough taxes, and simply don’t know whom to trust with any
more tax money.
I must sign this letter as a citizen, taxpayer and voter, not as a teacher, since
that freedom has been taken from the teachers by the administration.  Do you
really know what goes on behind those stone walls at the high school?
Respectfully, Marvin L. Pickering.43 
So, in summary, the superintendent of the Lockport schools, Dr.
William Blatnick, had first sent a letter to the editor of the local newspaper 
in support of one of the tax referenda.  Pickering responded with the 
letter above, with many accusations of misfeasance and suggesting the 
Board was placing athletics above teachers’ salaries and education
generally.  Not surprisingly, the Lockport School Board viewed Pickering’s 
public statements as insubordination.  The Board decided to dismiss 
Pickering on October 8, 1964, but did hold a hearing on the dismissal, as 
required under the Illinois state tenure law. 
The same seven-member, elected Lockport School Board that had 
already decided to dismiss Pickering held a hearing over two days in the 
Lockport East High School library in November 1964. Of course,
Pickering was not surprised when the Board unanimously decided, on 
December 7, 1964, to terminate him because the Board acted as judge,
jury, and prosecutor during the hearing.  The Board concluded that 
numerous statements in the letter were false and it was in the “best
interests of his school” to dismiss him from employment.44 
Pickering’s last day of employment was the beginning of Christmas 
vacation, 1964.  During his time away from Lockport Central High 
School, which period would end up lasting nearly five years, Pickering
initially worked for the Campbell Soup Company as a food processing
supervisor and then later in the Uniroyal-Joliet Arsenal in the Production 
Training Department. 
43. Id. at 2–4 (majority opinion).  Much of the Illinois Supreme Court majority
decision is spent trying to establish that Pickering’s allegations were false or misleading 
and therefore the Board’s termination of his employment had been justified because he 
had not acted in the “best interests” of the school when he wrote this letter. Id. at 4–7 
(“A teacher who displays disrespect toward the Board of Education, incites
misunderstanding and distrust of its policies, and makes unsupported accusations against 
the officials is not promoting the best interests of his school, and the Board of Education
does not abuse its discretion in dismissing him.”). 
44. Id. at 6–7. 
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After being terminated from his $6900-per-year school teaching job,45 
Pickering did not take the School Board’s actions against him lying
down.  He first petitioned the Board and delivered 1260 signatures in
support of his continued employment.46  Next, he contacted the American
Federation of Teachers (AFT) at its Chicago national headquarters.47 
The AFT pledged a fight to the finish for his cause.48  The AFT appointed 
well-known civil rights litigator John Ligtenberg, of Chicago’s Ligtenberg, 
Goebel & DeJong, to defend him.49 
Pickering, then twenty-eight years old, challenged the Board’s 
termination decision in the Will County Circuit Court in January 1965, 
arguing that his free speech rights had been violated by the Board’s 
actions.50  At the time, Pickering stated, “A man doesn’t give up his right
to freedom of speech when he becomes a school teacher.”51  Superintendent 
Blatnick responded: “We don’t question his right to write letters.  We 
just say that they should be true statements.”52 
In March 1966, while Pickering was still working at Campbell Soup,
Will County Circuit Court Judge Michael A. Orenic held in favor of the
 45. Norman Glubok, Teacher Who Lost Job for Speaking Out Will Sue Board, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1964, at C15. 
 46. Pickering, supra note 39. 
47. “[The AFT’s] activity in aiding individual teachers in academic freedom 
disputes has been ad hoc in nature, limited to supplying legal and financial aid for 
teachers seeking relief in the courts.”  Developments in the Law—Academic Freedom, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1121 (1968) (citing Letter from John Ligtenberg, Gen. Counsel,
Am. Fed’n of Teachers, to the Harvard Law Review (Dec. 22, 1967) (on file with the
Harvard Law Review)). 
48. Union To Help Fired Teacher in Court Fight, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1965, at D9. 
49. John Ligtenberg was also the general counsel of the AFT at the time. Id.  
Ligtenberg already had a national reputation, having submitted an amicus brief for the
AFT in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  He would later go on to 
argue the important due process employment law case of Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972), which extended due process protections to termination of government
employees, and to submit amicus briefs in Cleveland Board of Education v. Lafleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974), on brief with now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, which struck down a
restrictive maternity leave requirement that effectively served to punish women for 
exercising their right to bear children, and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972), which found a university teacher plaintiff did not have a property interest in 
continued employment. 
50. Fired Teacher Files Suit To Be Reinstated, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7, 1965, at W3. 
 51. Glubok, supra note 45. 
52. Id.
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Board.53  Judge Orenic concluded that “[t]he greater public interest of
the schools overrides the issue of freedom of speech rights of a teacher.”54 
Pickering then bypassed the Illinois Appellate Court and filed for
review of the Circuit Court’s decision with the Illinois Supreme Court. 
He based his challenge on free speech and denial of due process claims
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
After oral argument of the case in November 1966, on January 19, 1967, 
the Illinois Supreme Court decided in a 3–2 decision55 in favor of the 
Lockport School Board.  Justice Ray I. Klingbiel, for the majority, held
that the school need not “continue to employ one who publishes
misleading statements which are reasonably believed to be detrimental
to the schools.”56  Yet, in a stinging dissent, Justice Walter V. Schaefer
found that “the State and Federal constitutions require a more precise 
standard than ‘the interests of the schools.’”57  Justice Schaefer also took 
the majority to task for deferring to the factfinding of the very Board that
fired Pickering and for not pointing to any evidence that Pickering knew 
that any of the statements he made in his letter to the editor were false.58 
He concluded by stating that “[t]o be entitled to the protection of the first
amendment it is not necessary that the plaintiff’s letter be a model of
literary style, good taste and sound judgment.  In my view it is not, but
my view is irrelevant.”59  After his defeat at the Illinois high court,
Pickering filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court.  The Court granted certiorari, noting probable jurisdiction, on
November 6, 1967.
B.  Pickering at the U.S. Supreme Court
Oral argument in the case took place on March 27, 1968.  The oral 
argument lasted for some forty-nine minutes.60  John Ligtenberg, for 
Pickering, framed the argument as a pure First Amendment question of 
whether a public school teacher had the constitutional right to criticize 
the School Board and its policies in the local press.  In this regard, he 
53. Court Upholds Board’s Firing of Teacher, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 1966, at B11.
54. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. The Illinois Supreme Court normally has seven justices, but there were two 
vacancies at the time of the Pickering case.  Of the five justices who heard the case, the 
three justices in the majority were Republicans, and the two dissenting justices were 
Democrats. Pickering, supra note 39. 
56. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. 1967), rev’d, 391 U.S. 563 
(1968). 
57. Id. at 7 (Schaefer, J., dissenting). 
58. Id. at 7–8. 
59. Id. at 10. 
60. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 39. 
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maintained that public employees had constitutional rights just like 
ordinary citizens and should not have to forfeit them just because they
became government employees.  Ligtenberg cited the recently decided
Keyishian v. Board of Regents loyalty oath case for this proposition.61 
He also pointed out that even if some of Pickering’s written statements
were false, they nevertheless served the important function of helping 
the public arrive at the truth of the matter. 
John F. Cirricione argued the case for the Lockport School Board.  His 
argument, like the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion, focused on the alleged
harm Pickering’s statements caused to the Superintendent, Board, and 
fellow teachers who supported the tax increase referenda.  In essence,
Cirricione maintained the essential falsity of Pickering’s statements in 
the letter, though he did not allege the statements were knowingly false. 
He also contended that because Pickering was negligent in his allegations, 
the school district had the ability to terminate him so that the efficiency
of its services to the public would not be undermined.  This argument 
gave little weight to Pickering and his First Amendment speech rights 
and concentrated instead on the control that an employer should have 
over an employee in such circumstances.62 
In an 8–1 decision63 written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court
held that Pickering had a First Amendment right to free speech that 
could not be forfeited to serve the “best interests” of the school district.64 
Although Justice Marshall recognized that the government’s relationship
61. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
62. A number of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices seemed highly skeptical during 
oral argument that the medium of communication (oral versus written) or the audience
for the communication (teachers versus the general public) should make any difference 
whatsoever.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 39.  Of course, Justice 
Marshall’s opinion for the majority in Pickering specifically found that such differences
in mode and manner of public employee speech did not warrant different legal standards. 
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). 
63. Justice White wrote an opinion that concurred in part and dissented in part. 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 582–84 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Although Justice White agreed with the majority holding that Pickering had the right to 
author the letter, he wrote a partial dissent to say he disagreed that knowingly false 
comments that cause no harm should also be protected by the First Amendment. Id. 
64. See id. at 565, 567 (majority opinion); see also Justices Extend Teachers’ Free 
Speech Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1968, at 24 (“Public school teachers may not be 
discharged for good-faith criticism of school officials, even if some of the charges are
false, the Supreme Court ruled today.”). 
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to individuals was necessarily different in the employment context,65 he
nevertheless firmly stated that public employees have constitutional
rights, including rights to free speech.66 
If public employees retain their First Amendment rights, the question 
is then, How should the Court balance each of the parties’ competing 
interests?  Justice Marshall described the appropriate balance this way:
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
[public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.67 
To be clear, the governmental interests recognized in Pickering are not 
in any sense constitutional rights but rather are interests that government 
employers have in maintaining “a significant degree of control over their 
employees’ words and actions” because “without it, there would be little 
chance for the efficient provision of public services.”68  The balance
undertaken in Pickering is required because even though the government 
employer performs “important public functions”69 and consequently
possesses far broader powers in its employer capacity than in its sovereign 
capacity,70 “a citizen who works for the government is nonetheless a 
citizen.”71  Consequently, the First Amendment does limit the ability of
the public employer to condition employment of that employee on the 
forfeiture of his or her constitutional rights under this doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.72 
Important considerations in carrying out the Pickering balance include 
whether the public employee’s speech impairs discipline by superiors, 
harmony among coworkers, close working relationships for which 
personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or the performance of the 
65. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (“[I]t cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests 
as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in 
general.”). 
66. Id. at 565.
67. Id. at 568. 
68. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418–19 (2006) (comparing to Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983), which found that “government offices could not 
function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter”).
69. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
70. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994)
(plurality opinion)); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 1110 (3d ed. 2006) (“[S]peech by public employees is clearly less 
protected than other speech.”). 
71. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419. 
72. See id. (“The First Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to
leverage the employment relationship to restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties 
employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.” (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 
U.S. 593, 597 (1972))). 
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employee’s duties or the regular operation of the enterprise.73  In  
Pickering itself, the balancing came out in favor of Pickering because
(1) the statements in the letter related to matters of public concern— 
whether the school system required additional funds for transportation 
and other educational needs, (2) no evidence existed that the statement
interfered with Pickering’s job duties or with the operation of the school
in general, and (3) he was speaking in his capacity as a private citizen.74 
In such instances, Justice Marshall concluded that “it is necessary to 
regard [Pickering] as the member of the general public he seeks to be.”75 
Perhaps equally important, the Court majority in Pickering also noted 
how critical it was to allow public employees, like Pickering, to speak 
out on matters of public concern because such employees are at many times
in the best position to have “informed and definite opinions.”76  In other
words, public employees help to ensure the transparency and accountability
of representative, democratic governments.  Public employees will speak
out on matters of government abuse, waste, or fraud, but only if they are
assured that they do not risk those very jobs every time they speak.
Unfortunately, more recent case developments since Pickering suggest 
that the Supreme Court has not focused enough on this important aspect 
of the Pickering decision. The initial unraveling of this strong statement 
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the government-as-
employment context finds its root in parallel developments in the
government-as-sovereign context.
IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS WHEN GOVERNMENT
ACTS AS SOVEREIGN 
Public employee free speech rights reached their zenith as a result of 
the Pickering holding.  Yet, the seeds of their destruction were already 
being planted in the parallel context of the unconstitutional conditions 
73. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569–73 (1968). 
74. See id. at 571–73.  Here, it can hardly be doubted that expressly signing the 
letter “as a citizen, taxpayer, and voter, not as a teacher,” see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 
225 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1967) (emphasis added), immeasurably helped Pickering under the 
standard developed by the Court. 
75. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. 
76. Id. at 572 (“Teachers are . . . members of a community most likely to have
informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools 
should be spent.  Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such
questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”). 
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doctrine when the government acts as a sovereign towards its citizen. 
Importantly, in those cases, the penalty-subsidy debate among the
Justices shaped the modern contours of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.  As will be illustrated, the holdings in the government-as-
sovereign cases have now slowly infiltrated into the government-as-
employer context, primarily through the doctrinal innovation of the
government speech doctrine.  After reviewing the government-as-sovereign 
precedent, the Article will therefore discuss how the penalty-subsidy
jurisprudential divide has come to shape the Court’s modern treatment of 
public employee speech law. 
A.  The Historical Foundations of the Doctrine of      
Unconstitutional Conditions 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions existed in various forms 
before Marvin Pickering’s fateful showdown with the Lockport School 
Board.  Not only had the doctrine been applied the year before in a seminal 
loyalty oath case involving a public university professor, Keyishian v. 
Board of Regents,77 but it has since been applied to a wide variety of
constitutional cases.  These cases involved tax exemptions,78 users of 
public facilities,79 and recipients of government subsidies.80  In these 
cases, the Court initially pushed back against government attempts to 
condition receipt of government largesse based on forfeiture of citizens’ 
constitutional rights.81 
So where does the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions find its 
judicial roots?  Although not rooted in any single clause of the Constitution, 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is a creature of judicial
implication.82  In its simplest terms, the doctrine prohibits the government
77. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (striking down state 
law prohibiting employment of public school teachers who advocate overthrowing U.S. 
government as a violation of employees’ rights to free association). 
78. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
79. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 
395–96 (1993) (holding unconstitutional a law that allowed the school district to deny
the church use of its property to show religious films); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 
187–88 (1972) (holding that a state college campus may not, consistent with the First
Amendment, deny recognition to a student organization based on political affiliation).
80. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
81. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the 
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–7 (1988) (noting that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine “has bedeviled courts and commentators alike”). 
82. Id. at 10–11. 
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from conditioning a benefit based on forfeiture of an individual’s
constitutional right.83 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions first enjoyed widespread
use in the early part of the twentieth century when the Lochner Court84 
initially developed economic substantive due process.85  Under this form
of substantive due process, the Lochner Court emphasized property 
rights and the freedom to contract.86  But with the ascendancy of
Roosevelt’s New Deal Court in the late 1930s and the overruling of 
much of the Lochner Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence in
the ensuing period,87 the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions went 
through a substantial period of disuse.
Subsequently, the Warren Court renewed the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in a number of cases involving civil liberties.  Many 
of these cases involved the government in its role as sovereign, seeking 
to induce certain preferred outcomes through use of government 
subsidies and tax exemptions.  In these cases, the government sought to
83. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 
1415, 1421–22 (1989) (“Unconstitutional conditions problems arise when government
offers a benefit on condition that the recipient perform or forego an activity that a
preferred constitutional right normally protects from government interference.”). 
84. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56–57 (1905) (utilizing a substantive 
due process analysis to strike down maximum hour law for bakers because of its 
“arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty”).  The
Lochner Court constitutionalized property rights and the liberty to contract under a
theory of economic substantive due process as a means to strike down much social
welfare legislation during the first part of the twentieth century. See Michael J. Phillips, 
The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due Process, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 917, 919– 
20 (1999); see also Gregory M. Stein, Nuance and Complexity in Regulatory Takings 
Law, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 389, 395 (2006) (noting that the Lochner Court
protected property rights at the expense of popular government). 
85. Economic substantive due process commonly refers to the constitutionalization 
of an economic libertarian judicial philosophy through use of the substantive component 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  See Phillips, supra
note 84, at 918 n.5, 919–20. 
86. See id. at 919–920. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions can technically
be found first in Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876): “Though a 
State may have the power, if it sees fit to subject its citizens to the inconvenience, of
prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting business within its jurisdiction, it
has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions upon their doing so.”  Id. at 543
(Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 87. Indeed, Lochner itself came into disfavor during this time.  See Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977) (“The holding in Lochner has been implicitly rejected many
times.” (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 481–82 (1965); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729–30 (1963); FHA v.
Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91–92 (1959))). 
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utilize its Spending Clause power88 to award government largesse to
individuals in return for these individuals’ agreeing to conditions that 
burdened their exercise of constitutional rights.89  In such cases, the 
question became, “[W]hen government conditions a benefit on the
recipient’s waiver of a preferred liberty, should courts review the
conditioned benefit deferentially, as a benefit, or strictly, as a burden on 
a preferred liberty?”90 
B.  The Penalty-Subsidy Debate 
In answering this foundational question, a considerable amount of
dissonance has historically existed between two groups of Justices, and 
indeed two different schools of jurisprudential thought have sprung up
concerning how to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  So-
called liberal or progressive Justices construe the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine more expansively and generally find that conditions
placed on government benefits represent a penalty on the exercise of
individual rights protected by the Constitution.  As such, these conditions 
are subject to strict scrutiny and are usually found unconstitutional.91  In
contrast, the subsidy group of conservative Justices narrowly construes 
the doctrine and finds most government conditions to be mere “subsidies.” 
As such, these conditions are subjected to rational basis review and are 
generally upheld as constitutional; although individuals have the right to
exercise their constitutional rights, they do not have a right to have those 
rights subsidized.92 
1.  Penalty Cases 
The contours of the penalty-subsidy debate can first be seen in the 
1958 case of Speiser v. Randall.93  In that case, the Supreme Court held 
that the State of California could not condition veteran tax exemptions
88. The Spending Clause of the United States Constitution states, “The Congress 
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts 
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”  U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
89. Congress is allowed to provide incentives under its Spending Clause powers, 
but it may not coerce federal funding recipients through this power.  See South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (“[T]he [spending] power may not be used to induce the 
States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.”). 
90. See Sullivan, supra note 83, at 1415. 
91. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547–49 (2001); FCC
v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380, 402 (1984). 
92. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991); Regan v. Taxation
with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). 
93. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
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on individuals’ declaring that they did not advocate the violent overthrow of
the government.94  In this regard, Justice Brennan stated for the majority
that “[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms
of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.  Its deterrent
effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech.”95  In
the first hint of the debate to come, Justice Clark, writing in dissent,
found that the tax exemption program for veterans was in no sense a 
penalty and instead California was merely “declining to extend the
grace of the State to appellants.”96 
In another penalty case over twenty-five years later, the Court struck
down a government subsidy program in FCC v. League of Women
Voters of California.97  There, plaintiffs challenged section 399 of the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting Act,98 which conditioned public 
broadcasting subsidies based on noncommercial educational broadcasters’ 
agreeing not to editorialize.99  Justice Brennan found that section 399
violated the First Amendment rights of broadcasters because the law’s 
ban on editorializing far exceeded what was necessary to protect against 
the risk of governmental interference with the political process.100 In 
other words, Justice Brennan applied a strict level of scrutiny to this law 
because it burdened the First Amendment rights of broadcasters.101 
Although the government may have had a vital interest in regulating
94. Id. at 518.  In Speiser, California sought to have all veterans seeking a certain 
tax exemption sign a declaration that they did not advocate the overthrow of the United
States by force or violence or other unlawful means. Id. at 515. 
95. Id. at 518. 
96. Id. at 541 (Clark, J., dissenting).  This idea of declining to extend legislative 
“grace” has been recently repeated by Chief Justice Roberts in Engquist v. Oregon
Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 607 (2008): “[A] government’s decision to
limit the ability of public employers to fire at will is an act of legislative grace, not
constitutional mandate.”
97. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
98. Id. at 366; see 47 U.S.C. § 399 (2006). 
99. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 366. 
100. Id. at 395.  Then-Justice Rehnquist, for his part, dissented in League of Women
Voters based on his belief that the same analysis utilized in Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation, see discussion infra Part IV.B.2, should have applied.  League of Women 
Voters, 468 U.S. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Specifically, he argued that both
cases involved government allocation of public moneys as it desired and that such
allocations should not be disturbed if the government is able to show that the subsidy is 
rationally related to its governmental purpose. Id. at 407. 
101. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 395 (majority opinion) (arguing that the 
government regulation was overbroad and not crafted with sufficient precision to remedy
the dangers that the government sought to address). 
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public broadcasters, Justice Brennan was unconvinced that the means by
which the government attempted to accomplish its aims were narrowly
tailored.102 
More recently, in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, Justice Kennedy 
found that the federal law in question unreasonably interfered with the 
First Amendment rights of lawyers participating under the Legal Service 
Corporation (LSC) program.103  Under that program, LSC attorneys
could be prohibited from being involved in litigation challenging the 
validity of existing welfare laws for constitutional or statutory reasons 
when representing an indigent plaintiff in a welfare dispute.104  Specifically, 
Justice Kennedy found that government “may not design a subsidy to
effect this serious and fundamental restriction on advocacy of attorneys 
and the functioning of the judiciary.”105  The government subsidy, in
short, had crossed the line from a mere subsidy to an unconstitutional 
condition that coerced individuals in the exercise of their First Amendment
rights.106 
2.  Subsidy Cases 
Although subsidy arguments can be viewed in cases as early as
Speiser,107 the rise of the subsidy argument appears to mostly coincide
with the rise of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts and their conservative 
judicial philosophy.  For example, in Regan v. Taxation with Representation
102. Id.
103. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001). 
104. See id. at 537–38. 
105. Id. at 544. 
106. See id.  The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Scalia, found that the 
program was merely a subsidy and did not interfere with the indigent plaintiff’s right to
bring a welfare claim. See id. at 558–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In this regard, Justice 
Scalia stated that “[t]he [LSC] provision simply declines to subsidize a certain class of 
litigation, and . . . that decision ‘does not infringe the right’ to bring such litigation.”  Id.
at 553–54 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)).  Although Justice 
Kennedy, for the majority, was concerned with the practical effect of having an LSC 
attorney withdraw in the middle of the case, Justice Scalia cursorily responded, “No
litigant who, in the absence of LSC funding, would bring a suit challenging existing 
welfare law is deterred from doing so by [the LSC provision in controversy].”  Id. at 554. 
And even if they were, Justice Scalia reasoned, “So what?  The same result would ensue 
from excluding LSC-funded lawyers from welfare litigation entirely.”  Id. at 556.  It 
appears that Justice Scalia is arguing here that the greater right to completely not fund 
welfare litigation necessarily includes the lesser right to prohibit certain types of welfare
litigation.  Such reasoning, however, has been persuasively rejected in modern 
unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence on a number of grounds.  See Berman, supra
note 17, at 18–19 (describing the various rejoinders to the greater-includes-the-lesser 
argument).
107. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
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of Washington,108 the Court upheld a federal tax law provision that
conditioned tax exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code109 on recipients’ not participating in lobbying or partisan political
activities.110  Then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, made a
distinction between whether an organization is permitted to lobby as a 
result of a law, as opposed to whether Congress is required to provide
the organization with public money with which to lobby.111  Whereas the
former involves the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, Rehnquist 
maintained, the latter falls into a broad category of cases that stand for 
the proposition that “a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise 
of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.”112  As Rehnquist later 
explained in his dissent in League of Women Voters, “[W]hen the
Government is simply exercising its power to allocate its own public 
funds, [the Court] need only find that the condition imposed has a 
rational relationship to Congress’ purpose in providing the subsidy and 
that it is not primarily ‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’”113 
Finding such a rational relationship and the lack of an intention to suppress 
dangerous ideas, the majority in Regan upheld the IRC provision in 
dispute.114 
Subsidy cases after Regan have failed to shed much light on how this 
important distinction between a penalty and a subsidy can be made in an 
objective, consistent manner.  For instance, in the abortion-funding case
of Rust v. Sullivan,115 recipients of Title X family planning funds116 were
108. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
109. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (Supp. V 1982). 
110. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 551. 
111. Id.
112. Id. at 549; see also Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959)
(upholding a Treasury regulation that denied business expense deductions for lobbying
activities and rejecting the “notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully
realized unless they are subsidized by the State”).  For a recent example of this subsidy
principle, see generally Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), in which the Court refuses 
to force a state to subsidize an individual’s right of free exercise of religion in the higher 
education context. 
113. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 407 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513). 
114. Regan, 461 U.S. at 550–51. 
115. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).  Rust was, at the time, the latest in a 
long line of abortion-funding cases that had been similarly characterized as subsidy cases 
by the Court. These cases permitted various restrictions on a woman’s ability to choose 
to terminate her pregnancy. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 
(1989) (finding constitutional a statutory ban on use of public employees and facilities
for performance or assistance of nontherapeutic abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
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prohibited by new Health and Human Services regulations from engaging in 
abortion counseling, referral, and activities advocating abortion as a method 
of family planning.117  Chief Justice Rehnquist, analogizing Rust to 
Regan,118 asserted that what was at stake was only the subsidization
of fundamental rights—free speech rights and substantive due process 
rights—and not the denial of these same fundamental rights.119  In this  
regard, he maintained that “Congress’ refusal to fund abortion counseling 
and advocacy leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if
the Government had chosen not to fund family-planning services at
all.”120 Consequently, he applied rational review and found that the
government’s subsidization practices in this area were rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest and not related to the suppression
of a dangerous idea, namely, the promotion of the welfare of the mother 
and the unborn child.121 
In a later unconstitutional conditions case, the subsidy group of
Justices could only muster a plurality.  In United States v. American 
297, 315–17 (1980) (upholding governmental regulations withholding public funds for 
nontherapeutic abortions but allowing payments for medical services related to childbirth); 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478–80 (1977) (same). 
116. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300–300a-6 (2006).  Section 1008 of the Public Health 
Services Act prohibits funding recipients from using those funds if abortion is a potential 
family planning alternative. See id. § 300a-6. 
117. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 178, 180. 
118. See id. at 194, 197–98. 
119. Id. at 193 (“[T]he Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; 
it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”); see also id. at
192–93 (“[G]overnment may ‘make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, 
and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.’” (quoting Maher, 
432 U.S. at 474)); id. at 196 (“[Title X regulations] simply insist[ed] that public funds be 
spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.”).
120. Id. at 202. 
121. See id. at 193.  Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, wrote in his dissent that
the law in question based the granting of governmental largesse on the condition that 
doctors and other family planning funding recipients give up their rights to free speech 
under the First Amendment.  See id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Whatever may
be the Government’s power to condition the receipt of its largess upon the
relinquishment of constitutional rights, it surely does not extend to a condition that
suppresses the recipient’s cherished freedom of speech based solely upon the content or
viewpoint of that speech.”).  Moreover, he argued that “ensuring that federal funds are
not spent for a purpose outside the scope of the program . . . falls far short of that 
necessary to justify the suppression of truthful information and professional medical 
opinion regarding constitutionally protected conduct.”  Id. at 214.  He also noted that the 
regulation detrimentally impacted the Fifth Amendment rights of pregnant women to
choose whether or not to have a child. See id. at 216 (“By suppressing medically
pertinent information and injecting a restrictive ideological message unrelated to 
considerations of maternal health, the Government places formidable obstacles in the 
path of Title X clients’ freedom of choice and thereby violates their Fifth Amendment 
rights.”). 
930
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Library Ass’n,122 the dispute involved whether the Children Internet
Protection Act (CIPA)123 provision that provided a federal subsidy for
public libraries to install filtering software on their web-accessible
computers was an unconstitutional condition.124  Here, the plurality found 
the provision to be a mere subsidy, finding that “the use of filtering software 
helps to carry out these programs, [and therefore] it is permissible under 
Rust.”125 Both dissents found the CIPA provision in question to impose 
an unconstitutional condition, with Justice Stevens writing that the 
provision “impermissibly conditions the receipt of Government funding 
on the restriction of significant First Amendment rights.”126 
More recently, the Court decided the First Amendment case of
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR).127 
FAIR concerned the enactment of the Solomon Amendment by Congress, 
which prevents colleges and universities from receiving certain federal
funding128 if they prohibit military recruiters “from gaining access to 
campuses, or access to students . . . on campuses, for purposes of
military recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope 
122. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote the plurality decision in this subsidy case and was joined by subsidy
Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.  Id.
123. Children’s Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-335 
(2000).  Concerning CIPA, Professor Desai has observed: 
Rather than imposing a broad prohibition on the material that Congress
considered inappropriate, CIPA requires public libraries and public schools, as 
a condition of receiving certain federal benefits, to use ‘technological protection 
measures’ (for example, filtering software) to prevent library patrons and 
public school students from accessing objectionable sexually explicit material 
over the Internet. 
Anuj C. Desai, Filters and Federalism: Public Library Internet Access, Local Control,
and the Federal Spending Power, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (2004). 
124. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 210–13. 
125. Id. at 212. 
126. Id. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 231 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he blocking requirements of [CIPA] . . . impose an unconstitutional condition on the 
Government’s subsidies to local libraries for providing access to the Internet.”). The 
dissenters believed that the filtering software would inevitably block protected First 
Amendment speech either through underblocking or overblocking of web sites.  Id. at 
221–22 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 233–34 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
127. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 
U.S. 47 (2006). 
128. Id. at 51.  Although student financial assistance is not covered by the law, 
federal funding from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Transportation,
Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, among other agencies, may be lost at 
the university-wide level if schools do not comply with the Solomon Amendment.  See
10 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2006). 
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to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to any other 
employer.”129  A number of law schools believed that the Solomon
Amendment required them to choose between abandoning their policies 
against sexual orientation discrimination or losing a substantial amount 
of federal funding.130  This, they argued, infringed on their First 
Amendment rights of speech and association.131 
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the Solomon 
Amendment, holding, inter alia, that it significantly interfered with the 
First Amendment expressive association rights of the law schools in
question and therefore imposed an unconstitutional condition,132 the
Supreme Court reversed.133  The Court avoided the unconstitutional
condition question altogether by deciding that the expressive rights of 
the law schools were minimally burdened by the presence of military 
recruiters on campus.134  The Court concluded that a funding condition is
not unconstitutional if it can be constitutionally imposed directly135 and 
determined that imposing the access requirement would not violate the
law schools’ First Amendment rights to free speech or association.136  It
may be that because the current group of Justices is no longer able to
agree on a basis on which to label unconstitutional conditions cases as 
subsidy or penalty cases, they are simply choosing to avoid the issue 
altogether whenever possible. 
C.  The Penalty-Subsidy Schools at Loggerheads 
All in all, when the government acts in its sovereign capacity,
applying the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions remains fraught with 
uncertainties; and it appears that there is no end in sight to the current
doctrinal stalemate.  Even though the two sides in this jurisprudential 
struggle agree that government may unequally subsidize the exercise of
a constitutional right and may not condition a benefit on the denial of a 
constitutional right,137 that appears to be where the agreement ends.  In 
129. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2006). 
130. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 53. 
131. Id.
132. See Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 
219, 243 (3d Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 47. 
133. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 70.
134. Id. at 69–70. 
135. Id. at 59–60 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
136. Id. at 70. 
137. See Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 79 (2008) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he law normally gives legislatures broad authority to decide how to
spend the People’s money.  A legislature, after all, generally has the right not to fund 
activities that it would prefer not to fund—even where the activities are otherwise 
protected.” (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983)));
932
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deciding what a penalty case is and what a subsidy case is, the 
disagreement seems to revolve around whether government subsidization of
certain “alternative activity deemed in the public interest”138 is tantamount 
to “coercive interference” by the government with an individual’s
constitutional rights.139  Or perhaps put more simply, there is a certain line
beyond which government subsidy of an alternative activity becomes 
nothing less than the government’s acting in an intimidating manner to
interfere with the constitutional rights of its citizens.
The abortion-funding cases are typical of how the line drawing works 
in these cases.140  For example, the majority—subsidy Justices—labeled 
the state and federal laws mere subsidization because they did not 
believe the subsidization of an alternative activity—in those cases, the
promotion of child birth over abortion—significantly impinged on the 
right of pregnant women to choose to abort their pregnancies.141  This
stance appears to derive from the belief that differential subsidization is 
permissible as long as a formal opportunity to exercise constitutional
rights exists outside the program in another forum.142  Such a neoformalistic
approach thus first became apparent dealing with unconstitutional conditions 
in government-as-sovereign cases.
see also Lyng v. Auto. Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 368 (1988) (holding that the federal 
government’s refusal to provide food stamp benefits to striking workers was justified
because “strikers’ right of association does not require the Government to furnish funds 
to maximize the exercise of that right”).
138. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980). 
139. See id. at 327–28 (White, J., concurring); see also Sullivan, supra note 83, at 
1433 (noting that coercion has been invoked as a justification for “strik[ing] down
conditions that affect rights to freedom of speech, religion, and association, but without a 
consistent or satisfying theory”).  But see id. at 1505–06 (maintaining that labeling a case 
as an unconstitutional conditions one based on concerns of coercion is really just a 
“conclusory label masquerading as analysis”). 
140. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Harris, 448 U.S. 297; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
141. See, e.g., Harris, 448 U.S. at 315–16 (“[I]t simply does not follow that a 
woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial
resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices.”). 
142. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 198 (“By requiring that the Title X grantee engage in
abortion-related activity separately from activity receiving federal funding, Congress 
has, consistent with our teachings in League of Women Voters and Regan, not denied it 
the right to engage in abortion-related activities.  Congress has merely refused to fund 
such activities out of the public fisc, and the Secretary has simply required a certain 
degree of separation from the Title X project in order to ensure the integrity of the
federally funded program.”).
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Conversely, the dissenting penalty Justices in these same cases believe 
just as strongly that such subsidization significantly coerces doctors in
their free speech rights when counseling pregnant women and also
coerces these same women in their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights in deciding whether to carry a pregnancy to term.143  As an example,
Justice Blackmun in the Rust case found the majority’s conclusion
“insensitive and contrary to common human experience, [as b]oth the 
purpose and result of the challenged regulations are to deny women the 
ability voluntarily to decide their procreative destiny.”144  This point of
view derives from these penalty Justices’ firmly held belief that a formal
analysis under these circumstances is insufficient and that social justice 
instead requires a more practical analysis of the impact of such cases.145 
Such an approach requires nothing less than considering how the
outcome of the case will actually affect the parties.146 
In short, it might be said without exaggeration that the quagmire in 
which the Court finds itself in these unconstitutional conditions cases 
where government acts in its sovereign capacity is as fundamental as the 
distinction between legal formalism and legal realism.147 Yet, as discussed 
143. See, e.g., id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“By suppressing medically pertinent 
information and injecting a restrictive ideological message unrelated to considerations of
maternal health, the Government places formidable obstacles in the path of Title X 
clients’ freedom of choice and thereby violates their Fifth Amendment rights.”). 
144. Id. at 217.  Justice Blackmun would instead have applied a more searching 
form of scrutiny and, at the very least, balanced the government’s interests in promoting
a certain type of family planning against the First Amendment rights of doctors and the 
Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights of pregnant women.  See id. at 213–14. 
145. In other words, the penalty Justices would argue that it is necessary to
practically consider the impact that the nonsubsidization will have on individuals whose
constitutional rights may be impacted.  This line of reasoning resonates with the current 
political debate between President Obama and his detractors over the need for a Supreme
Court Justice to have empathy and to understand the real world implications of his or her 
decisions.  See, e.g., Janet Hook & Christi Parsons, Obama Says Empathy Key to Court
Pick, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2009, at A1 (“President Obama, who will choose the nominee, 
focused not on volatile ideological questions but on personal character, saying he wanted 
someone with ‘empathy’ for ‘people’s hopes and struggles.’”). 
146. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 144 (2002) (“For the Supreme Court, proceeding as it 
appears to proceed in these [federalism] cases with an agenda, the facts are of minor 
importance and the persons affected are worthy of almost no attention. . . .  The people 
and their problems that have been grist for the constitutional mill are incidental.”); see 
also Sullivan, supra note 83, at 1497–98 (arguing for a “systemic” approach to
unconstitutional conditions, which, among other things, “recognizes that background 
inequalities of wealth and resources necessarily determine one’s bargaining position in 
relation to government, and that the poor may have nothing to trade but their liberties”).
Justice Rehnquist clearly does not agree with Sullivan’s and her legal realist compatriots’
approach because in deciding Rust—for which Sullivan was on brief for petitioners—he 
sided with respondents and characterized the case, yet again, as a subsidy case.
147. Although legal formalism and legal realism are capable of many different 
meanings, Judge Posner offers some helpful insights in this regard.  He defines legal 
934
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above, the practical or realist approach adopted by the penalty Justices is 
more of a response to an emerging neoformalism in which the subsidy 
group pays insufficient attention to the real world consequences of its 
decisions.  And as the sides continue to talk past one another, the gap in 
understanding how to consistently apply the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions in the government-as-sovereign context persists.148 
But this neoformalist-pragmatist divide in unconstitutional conditions
cases is not limited to the government-as-sovereign context.  Since the 
Court’s decision in Pickering, the same divide has animated the
unconstitutional conditions analysis in the public employment context. 
As demonstrated in Part V, the subsidy Justices have also emerged
victorious in their judicial battles with the penalty Justices in cases in
which government acts in its employer capacity.  But in this area, the use 
of the government speech doctrine has done a substantial amount of the 
heavy analytical lifting for the subsidy Justices.
V. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS WHEN GOVERNMENT
ACTS AS AN EMPLOYER 
In some ways, the development of the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions in employment has paralleled its development in the subsidy
context.  For example, just as the United States Supreme Court once held
that government benefits were mere privileges that could be withheld or 
limited on any condition,149 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once famously
said that in the employment context, a person “may have a constitutional 
formalism as “enabl[ing] a commentator to pronounce the outcome of the case as being
correct or incorrect, in approximately the same way that the solution to a mathematical
problem can be pronounced as correct or incorrect.”  Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism,
Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 179, 181 (1986).  Legal realism, in contrast, is defined as “deciding a case so that 
its outcome best promotes public welfare in nonlegalistic terms; it is policy analysis.” 
Id.  Interestingly, Judge Posner does not believe formalism or realism should be utilized
when interpreting statutes or constitutional provisions, but only in developing the
common law. See id.
148. See generally Barbara A. Sanchez, Note, United States v. American Library 
Association: The Choice Between Cash and Constitutional Rights, 38 AKRON L. REV. 
463, 492–93 (2005) (discussing the continuing chasm of views on the proper application
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in American Library Association). 
149. See, e.g., People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 429–30 (N.Y. 1915), aff’d, 239 U.S. 
195 (1915) (limiting public employment to citizens on the theory that “[w]hatever is a 
privilege, rather than a right, may be made dependent on citizenship”).
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right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”150 
But just as Supreme Court precedent has sought to establish the end of
the right-privilege distinction when the government acts in the sovereign
capacity,151 the Court, at least initially, arrived at this same conclusion in 
the government-as-employer context as well.152  For instance, in the
landmark public employment case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the 
Supreme Court stated emphatically: “[T]he theory that public employment 
which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions,
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.”153 
Thus, as in the sovereignty context, the government “may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.”154  The same
reasoning that applied to the government-as-sovereign cases also applies 
here: “For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of
his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of 
those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited”155 and “produce 
a result which [it] could not command directly.”156  Yet, important  
distinctions do remain when the government acts as an employer as
150. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892); see 
also Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952) (finding “no constitutional 
infirmity” to a law that required public employees to declare past and present Communist
affiliation). 
151. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973) (“[T]his Court now has 
rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit 
is characterized as a ‘right’ or as a ‘privilege.’” (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365, 374 (1971))). 
152. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967) (“[C]onstitutional 
doctrine which has emerged since [Adler] has rejected its major premise.  That premise 
was that public employment, including academic employment, may be conditioned upon
the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct government
action.”).
153. See id. at 605–06 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 
(2d Cir. 1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 
U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even 
though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the 
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons 
upon which government may not rely.”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)
(stating that in the unemployment compensation and free exercise of religion context, 
“[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege”). 
154. See Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597. 
155. Id.
156. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
(1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 
(1972) (“[C]onstitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or ‘chilling,’ effect of 
governmental [efforts] that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First
Amendment rights.”); Mazzone, supra note 3, at 806 (“The doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions rejects the notion that the government’s power to grant a benefit includes the 
lesser power to attach any conditions at all to receiving that benefit.”).
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opposed to when it acts in its sovereign capacity.  As already discussed, 
Justice Marshall emphatically stated in Pickering that “it cannot be 
gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the
speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses
in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”157 
Although Justice Marshall in Pickering did not cite to any precedent to 
support his assertion about the uniqueness of the government in its 
employer capacity, the Supreme Court on numerous occasions since has
affirmed this view of the varying degrees of power that government has 
depending upon which hat it is wearing.158  For example, in her opinion
for the Court in Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr,159 Justice 
O’Connor explained that a government employee’s close “relationship 
with the government requires a balancing of important free speech and
government interests.”160  In such relationships, “[t]he government needs
to be free to terminate both employees and contractors for poor
performance, to improve the efficiency, efficacy, and responsiveness of
service to the public, and to prevent the appearance of corruption.”161  In
157. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (emphasis added); see 
supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
158. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671–72 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“We
have never explicitly answered this question [about the government’s dual roles], though
we have always assumed that its premise is correct—that the government as employer
indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign.” (citing Pickering, 
391 U.S. at 568)); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 US 687, 718 (1994) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“We have . . . no one Free Speech Clause test.  We have different tests for 
content-based speech restrictions, for content-neutral speech restrictions, for restrictions 
imposed by the government acting as employer, for restrictions in nonpublic fora, and so
on.”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l 
Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973); see also Eugene Volokh, A Common-
Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1497 (1999)
(“Administrative efficiency is generally not considered a compelling interest under strict 
scrutiny, which may be one reason that free speech cases have explicitly adopted a more 
deferential standard for government-as-employer regulations, instead of purporting to
apply strict scrutiny.” (citation omitted)).
159. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996). 
160. Id. at 680. 
161. Id. at 674; see also Waters, 511 U.S. at 674–75 (“[T]he extra power the 
government has in this area comes from the nature of the government’s mission as 
employer.  Government agencies are charged by law with doing particular tasks.
Agencies hire employees to help do those tasks as effectively and efficiently as possible.
When someone who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to the agency’s effective
operation begins to do or say things that detract from the agency’s effective operation,
the government employer must have some power to restrain her.”); see also Mark
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1250 
(1999) (“The government has instrumental or programmatic goals within the domain of
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a similar vein, Justice Powell explained in his concurring opinion in
Arnett v. Kennedy that “the Government’s interest . . . is the maintenance 
of employee efficiency and discipline. . . .  To this end, the Government, 
as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the
management of its personnel and internal affairs.”162  Lastly, in her
plurality decision in Waters v. Churchill, Justice O’Connor juxtaposed 
the two roles that government plays by describing certain First
Amendment doctrines that could not be reasonably applied to speech of 
government employees163 and by outlining the less stringent procedural 
requirements for restrictions on government employees’ speech.164 
But although it is generally agreed that the government has more 
power to interfere with constitutional rights in its employment
capacity,165 it is far from clear how to assess which employment practices
are permissible and which are not.166  In any event, the Court on numerous 
occasions since Pickering has reaffirmed this view of the government’s 
greater latitude when conditioning public employee rights in the 
workplace.167 
management.  When acting there, it may restrict individual autonomy in the service of its 
programmatic goals.” (footnote omitted) (citing C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and
Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16–21 (1998))).  Indeed, absent contractual,
statutory, or constitutional restriction, the government is entitled to terminate employees
and contractors on an at-will basis, for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. See
Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674. 
162. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).  If it 
were otherwise, Justice Powell explains, the government employer would not be able to 
remove inefficient and unsatisfactory workers quickly, and the government’s substantial 
interest in so doing would be frustrated without adequate justification. Id. 
163. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 672 (plurality opinion) (reviewing a number of First 
Amendment doctrines, such as obscenity, that do not apply with the same force in the 
government-as-employer context, and stating that the employer “may bar its employees 
from using Mr. Cohen’s offensive utterance to members of the public or to the people 
with whom they work” (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971))). 
164. See id. at 673 (observing that although speech restrictions on private citizens
must precisely define the speech they target, a government employer is permitted to
prohibit its employees from acting “rude to customers,” even though this restriction
would be void for vagueness under traditional First Amendment jurisprudence). 
165. See id. (observing that the Court has “consistently given greater deference to
government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to
predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large”). 
166. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983) (noting the difficulty
associated with the Pickering balancing); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom 
of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 204 (1998) 
(“The Court has acknowledged that ‘such particularized balancing is difficult,’ and this
seems to be an understatement.  From all we’ve seen of the lower court decisions, the
test is essentially indeterminate in all but the easiest cases.” (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 150)). 
167. See, e.g., Waters, 511 U.S. at 671–72 (plurality opinion) (“We have never 
explicitly answered this question [about the government’s dual roles], though we have 
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A.  The Dwindling First Amendment Speech Rights of        
Public Employees Post-Pickering 
Although Pickering came out in favor of Marvin Pickering, the 
development of the doctrine since then has been generally one of limiting 
the scope of the balancing test set forth therein.  Initially, the Court 
continued to protect public employee rights through the Pickering
constitutional balance.  For instance, public employee free speech cases 
post-Pickering have established that the First Amendment protects
government workers from being terminated for privately criticizing their 
employer’s policies,168 for publicly expressing dislike for prominent 
political figures,169 and even when those workers are independent contractors
for the government employer.170 
Yet, not too long after public employee free speech protection reached 
its apex in Pickering, a new group of Justices began to whittle away
these protections.  First, the Court in Mount Healthy Board of Education v.
Doyle made it easier for employers to defend against these First
Amendment claims.171  Under the Mount Healthy framework, even if a
public employee can show that an employer’s adverse employment action 
was motivated by the employee’s protected speech, Justice Rehnquist
developed the “same decision” test to protect public employers from 
liability in a subcategory of cases.  Under the same decision test, if the 
employer can prove that it would have made the same decision regarding 
the employee in the absence of the protected speech, it may escape
liability.172  Justice Rehnquist wrote in this regard: “The constitutional
principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed
in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct.”173 
Next, the Court decided the “public concern” test of Connick v. 
Myers.174  Recall that in Pickering, Justice Marshall set up the balancing 
test this way:
always assumed that its premise is correct—that the government as employer indeed has 
far broader powers that does the government as sovereign.”). 
168. See, e.g., Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414–16 (1979). 
169. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386 (1987). 
170. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 673 (1996). 
171. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977). 
172. Id. at 285–86. 
173. Id.
174. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983). 
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The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
[public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees.175 
Justice White, the partial dissenter in Pickering and now writing for the 
majority in Connick, utilized the italicized language above from 
Pickering to require that the public employee first show that he or she 
spoke on a matter of public concern before getting the benefit of the 
Pickering balance.176  The Court adopted this new requirement based on
“the common-sense realization that government offices could not function if
every employment decision became a constitutional matter.”177  Going 
forward, public employee speech characterized as being a matter of
“private interest,” like a personnel dispute, would no longer receive the 
protection of the First Amendment.178 
The coup de grâce against Pickering, however, was recently delivered 
by the Roberts Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos.179  In  Garcetti, a deputy 
district attorney for Los Angeles County, Richard Ceballos, was subjected
to adverse employment actions for speaking out about an allegedly
defective search warrant in a criminal case.180  Although the Garcetti 
Court paid lip service to its commitment to the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions in public employment,181 Justice Kennedy for the 5–4 majority
nonetheless held that if employees are engaged in speech pursuant to 
their official duties at work, they are not speaking as “citizens” and thus
enjoy no First Amendment protection for their speech.182  Because
Ceballos was engaged in speech pursuant to his job duties, he was not 
speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern but only as a
government employee.  As such, the Court concluded that Ceballos did
175. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (emphasis added). 
176. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140–41, 143. 
177. Id. at 143. 
178. To be fair, though, the hurdle imposed by Connick becomes much more
manageable in a small subset of cases in which the public employee speech is found to 
be completely unrelated to his or her public employment and is spoken on the employee’s 
own time in a nonworking setting.  See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 
513 U.S. 454, 465–66, 475 (1995). 
179. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
180. Id. at 413–15. 
181. See id. at 417 (“The Court has made clear that public employees do not
surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment.  Rather, the 
First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak 
as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.”). 
182. Id. at 424.  Interestingly, this holding that government workers cannot act as 
employees and citizens at the same time controverts a previous statement of the Court
that a teacher making a presentation before a board of education “spoke both as an
employee and a citizen exercising First Amendment rights.”  City of Madison Joint Sch.
Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 176 n.11 (1976). 
940
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not have any First Amendment protection, and there was no need to
consider under Connick whether he spoke on a matter of public concern
or to conduct a Pickering balancing of interests.183 
Garcetti drastically cuts down on public employees’ First Amendment 
speech rights.184  In the name of managerial prerogative,185 federalism, 
and separation of powers,186 Garcetti has the effect of making government
less transparent, accountable, and responsive.  This is because public 
employees are now less secure in their ability to speak out against
governmental fraud, abuse, and waste without facing retribution from 
their public employers.187  The Garcetti majority, rather than focusing on 
the importance of public employees’ ability to help ensure the
maintenance of an accountable and transparent government as the 
Pickering Court did, focused instead on more sinister concerns about 
employees’ impairing the proper performance of efficient governmental
functions.  The decision also inappropriately focuses on the formal 
opportunity to still exercise constitutional rights, even though employees 
cannot now exercise those rights while working and performing their 
assigned duties.  In all, then, Garcetti redefines the role public employees
should play in ensuring the fair and efficient administration of government 
services.188 
183. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
184. David L. Hudson Jr., Garcettized! ‘06 Ruling Still Zapping Speech, FIRST 
AMENDMENT CTR. (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.
aspx?id=22501 (“[Garcetti] has led to the dismissal of legions of public-employee 
lawsuits.  It has threatened legitimate whistleblowers wanting to speak out on important
matters of public concern.”). 
185. See Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial 
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 38 (2008) (“The Court’s opinion [in Garcetti] 
contains a sketch—concededly partial and somewhat obscure—of managerial control 
over employee speech as essential if management is to be held politically accountable for
the performance of public institutions.”). 
186. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 617 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Court has refused to establish a constitutional rule that
would require or allow ‘permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental
operations to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and the separation 
of powers.’” (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423)). 
187. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(“Government employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies 
for which they work.”).
188. See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s 
Control of Its Workers’ Speech To Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2009). 
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B.  Garcetti as a Subsidy Public Employment Case 
Prior examination of Garcetti, however, does not sufficiently explain
how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been undermined in 
the public employment free speech context.  This is not your great-
grandfather’s legal formalism.  To understand more fully how the subsidy 
school of thought has begun to hold sway in cases in which government
acts in its employment capacity, it is necessary to consider the Garcetti
majority’s invocation of a line of argument extraneous to the Pickering
doctrine.189 
This line of argument involves a particular brand of subsidy argument. 
In coming to its conclusion in Garcetti, the majority commented that 
Ceballos’s speech “owe[d] its existence to [his] professional responsibilities” 
and “simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the 
employer itself has commissioned or created.”190  Justice Souter pondered 
aloud in his dissent, “[W]hy do the majority’s concerns, which we all
share, require categorical exclusion of First Amendment protection
against any official retaliation for things said on the job?”191  The answer 
appears to be: Because the subsidy approach requires it. 
Recall the abortion-funding subsidy case of Rust v. Sullivan,192 in 
which the Court “held there was no infringement of the speech rights of 
Title X funds recipients and their staffs when the Government forbade 
any on-the-job counseling in favor of abortion as a method of family 
planning.”193 A corollary to this subsidy argument later developed by
the Court is that “when the government appropriates public funds to
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it
wishes.”194 
In Garcetti, rather than subsidizing a public health program and 
“simply insisting that public funds be spent [by doctors] for the purposes 
for which they were authorized,”195 the Court is in essence saying that 
public employment itself is “subsidized” by the government and thus the
government is entitled to say what it wishes through its government 
employees without worrying about these same employees’ First
Amendment free speech rights.  Thus, when an employee speaks out of 
turn like Assistant District Attorney Ceballos in the Garcetti case—or
189. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 436 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
190. Id. at 421–22 (majority opinion). 
191. Id. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
192. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177–78 (1991). 
193. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 437 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 192– 
200). 
194. Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
833 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
195. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196. 
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perhaps this reasoning even applies to Mr. Pickering himself—the
employee is no longer engaged in government speech.  He or she is also
without First Amendment protection according the Court because the 
government employer need not subsidize speech of which it does not
approve.196 
The Court thus does nothing less than turn the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine on its head by saying that the government employer 
is not conditioning public employment on public employees’ forfeiting 
their rights to speech but instead is merely requiring that its subsidized 
speech—in the mouth of its employee—be used to promote the
particular policies for which the employee was hired. 
Now, as Justice Souter points out in his Garcetti dissent, the comparison 
between the subsidization of speech in Rust and Garcetti is totally 
inapt.197  Whereas doctors are only allowed to take Title X funds if they
agree not to promote abortion, most public employees do not take their
jobs on the condition that they say only what the government wants them 
to say.198  This is not to say that such policymaking public employees do 
not exist, but employees like Pickering, Myers, and Ceballos are hired to 
perform a discretionary function, not to parrot the government.199 
Yet, by treating all public employees as merely promoting government
speech, the Garcetti court does nothing less than transform government
employment back into a privilege.  Justice Holmes’s observation is once
again apposite: “[A public employee] may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”200 
Similarly, under Garcetti’s conception, public school teachers, district 
attorneys, or police officers may have the right to talk politics on their 
own time, but those employees have no right to public employment if 
196. Under the government speech doctrine, individuals can be compelled to parrot 
government speech without implicating any individual First Amendment rights.  See 
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005). 
197. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]hese interests on the 
government’s part are entirely distinct from any claim that Ceballos’s speech was 
government speech with a preset or proscribed content as exemplified in Rust.”).
198. In this regard, Justice Souter notes that “[s]ome public employees are hired to
‘promote a particular policy’ by broadcasting a particular message set by the
government, but not everyone working for the government, after all, is hired to speak
from a government manifesto.” Id. at 437 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 
U.S. 533, 542 (2001)). 
199. Pickering was certainly not hired to parrot the Board line, though the Board 
would have certainly liked him not to be such a nuisance.
200. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
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they wish to engage in on-duty speech the government does not sanction.  
To do so, according to the majority in Garcetti, would be tantamount to 
requiring the government to subsidize employee speech that the government 
does not approve. 
In short, under the government speech doctrine, completely absent in 
Pickering, the subsidy school of jurisprudential thought has eviscerated
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public employment.  What is 
left is a neoformalism that permits the Court to say that as long as 
employees have a formal opportunity to exercise their constitutional
rights as citizens outside of their on-job work responsibilities, nothing 
more is required to protect them from the penalty imposed by this 
unconstitutional condition.  This neoformalism is particularly problematic 
because of its insidious nature.  Although much of the Garcetti decision
is clearly based on traditional categorical distinctions between citizen
and employees, the majority subsidy Justices also sneak in this observation 
about the connection between unconstitutional conditions and the
government speech doctrine.  The problem is that once lower federal
courts begin to treat public employee speech as equivalent to government
speech, even less of a possibility exists that the speech will garner any 
constitutional protection.  So, although public employee free speech
rights are presently in the process of fading away, an expansion of this 
government speech doctrine to encompass most government employees 
would be outright catastrophic for these employees’ constitutional rights 
in the workplace.
Consider the impact of this neoformalistic approach on just one
subsequent case, though there are many examples in the four years since 
Garcetti.201  In Haynes v. City of Circleville, Ohio, a police officer was 
fired for complaining about the incompetence of his superior in reducing 
training for the canine unit and for asserting his belief that these actions
would adversely affect public safety.202  Before Garcetti, the police
officer actually survived summary judgment at the district court level on 
his First Amendment retaliation claim because he was clearly speaking 
out on a matter of public concern.203 
After Garcetti, however, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the officer’s 
claim.  Once the court classified the officer as a “public employee
carrying out his professional responsibilities,”204 from that point forward
he was robbed of citizen status and was considered a mere employee 
without constitutional protections.  Remarkably, the court hinted that if 
201. See Hudson, supra note 184. 
202. Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 359 (6th Cir. 2007). 
203. Id. at 364. 
204. Id. (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006)). 
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the police officer had taken his gripe outside the police department and 
written a letter to a newspaper editor criticizing the city’s canine
program—much in the way Pickering brought his complaints about his 
school to the public—he could have received First Amendment protection.205 
The perverse incentive thus established by Garcetti is for employees 
such as the officer in Haynes not to bring their concerns and complaints 
through internal dispute mechanisms but rather to make any workplace 
disagreement into a public affair.  Although one would think such an 
outcome flies in the face of Pickering’s concern of ensuring the efficiency
of governmental service, nevertheless the neoformalist approach of 
Garcetti leads to this absurd result. 
VI. EMBRACING THE REALIST CRITIQUE OF NEOFORMALISM
The neoformalist conception of First Amendment rights in the public
employment context has made the government less transparent and 
accountable because public employees are now less secure in speaking 
about their public employment.  It is therefore important to restore the 
vitality of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine through a restoration 
of Pickering, its constitutional balancing standards, and the penalty 
version of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  Only when
government actions that practically truncate or impinge on the right of 
public employees are no longer tolerated will public employees again be 
able to be the vanguard of the citizenry, protecting all citizens against
government fraud, waste, and abuse.
A.  A Return to Pickering’s First Principles
Pickering itself is a penalty case. Consider that Pickering himself was
not hired to parrot the government line of the employer.  Indeed, he
wrote specifically “as a citizen” when he wrote his letter to the Lockport 
Herald.206 
The Pickering Court recognized that there was a potential of
government abuse if Pickering were able to be fired merely because “the 
best interests” of the school required it.  That line of argument, adopted 
by the Illinois Supreme Court majority in Pickering, would have held the 
constitutional rights of Pickering and others at the mercy of school 
205. Id. (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422). 
206. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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officials. The majority opinion in Pickering rejected the subsidy argument 
and adopted the penalty view that a substantial burden on a public 
employee’s free speech rights would be considered unconstitutional 
unless narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. 
Not only is the approach taken by the subsidy Justices in subsequent 
public employee free speech cases not narrowly tailored in that its
approach is being applied to employees who are not hired to parrot the 
government line,207 but the government interest being advanced is
downright inimical to the idea of an open and transparent democratic
society. Pickering spends much time discussing the importance of
having teachers and other public employees who work for the
government inform the rest of us about the events that transpire in the
government workplace.  These employees are ideally placed to sound the
alarm when government is no longer acting in the best interest of its 
people.  Through its holding in Garcetti, however, the Court has now 
made it nearly impossible for conscientious public servants to speak out 
in the best interests of the public without jeopardizing their careers. 
Under Pickering, it was not seen as inconsistent that the same person
could be both an effective government employee and an outspoken 
citizen concerned for the greater society.208  Under this broader conception
of public employment, there was no internal tension within these citizen-
employees because when they spoke publicly to point out an injustice in
government or to right a government wrong, not only were they making 
their own workplace better but they were making society better as well.209 
The Court itself developed this idea that public employees play a unique
role in a representative democracy in Pickering and other cases.210  Given 
207. Justice Souter in his Garcetti dissent suggests ample reason why the
government speech analysis should be mostly extraneous to the Pickering doctrine.  
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting).  He notes that “[s]ome public 
employees are hired to ‘promote a particular policy’ by broadcasting a particular 
message set by the government, but not everyone working for the government, after all, 
is hired to speak from a government manifesto.”  Id. at 437 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001)). 
208. Accord id. at 432 (“[T]he very idea of categorically separating the citizen’s 
interest from the employee’s interest ignores the fact that the ranks of public service 
include those who share the poet’s ‘object . . . to unite [m]y avocation and my vocation.’”
(second alteration in original) (quoting Robert Frost, Two Tramps in Mud Time, in
COLLECTED POEMS, PROSE, & PLAYS 251, 252 (R. Poirer & M. Richardson eds., 1995))).
209. Id. (“[T]hese citizen servants are the ones whose civic interest rises highest
when they speak pursuant to their duties, and these are exactly the ones government
employers most want to attract.”).
210. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (“Teachers are, as a class, 
the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to
how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent.  Accordingly, it is 
essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of 
retaliatory dismissal.”); see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per
946
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the sheer size of American government, it is impossible for ordinary
citizens to keep tabs on everything their government is doing at any
given time.  Government employees therefore must be the vanguard of
the citizenry.  This is so not only because of their physical proximity to 
the problem but also because of their special expertise in dealing with
the governmental issues that come to their attention.  Only the realist 
approach of the penalty Justices, which recognizes the practical 
consequences of government burdens on public employees’ constitutional
rights, permits these employees to carry out their essential role. 
B.  Constitutional Balancing as an Antidote to   
Neoformalist Reasoning
As discussed above, Garcetti’s government speech doctrine has the
ability to wreak havoc on public employees’ remaining constitutional
rights in a large subcategory of public employee free speech cases by
taking away public employees’ Pickering rights.211  By writing broad job
descriptions, government employers can claim that they are disciplining 
employees only for government speech by employees.  Because employees 
can claim no constitutional protection for such speech, employers are 
free to sanction employees who write or speak in a way that is not in the
best interest of their employer; in other words, this is exactly the theory
of law that existed prior to the development of the Pickering doctrine. 
In this regard, recall the Court majority in Garcetti found Ceballos did
not have First Amendment rights because the speech at issue “owe[d] its
existence to [his] professional responsibilities” and “simply reflects the 
exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has
commissioned or created.”212  In making this point, the Court—in a
parenthetical—draws language from the case of Rosenberger v. Rector
curiam) (“The Court has recognized the right of employees to speak on matters of public 
concern, typically matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the 
public at large, a subject on which public employees are uniquely qualified to 
comment.”). 
211. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The fallacy of the 
majority’s reliance on Rosenberger’s understanding of Rust doctrine . . . portends a 
bloated notion of controllable government speech going well beyond the circumstances
of this case.”); see also id. at 437 (“Rust is no authority for the notion that the 
government may exercise plenary control over every comment made by a public employee in
doing his job.”). 
212. See id. at 421–22 (majority opinion). 
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& Visitors of University of Virginia,213 which stated that “when the
government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of 
its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.”214  This language in turn was 
taken from similar language in the abortion-funding case of Rust v.
Sullivan,215 which, of course, relies on neoformalistic reasoning.216 
The solution to this neoformalist approach is to push for more 
standards and balancing of interests than bright-line rules.  Consider that 
Judge Posner defines legal formalism as “enabling a commentator to 
pronounce the outcome of the case as being correct or incorrect, in 
approximately the same way that the solution to a mathematical problem 
can be pronounced as correct or incorrect.”217  Of course, as Judge Noonan 
has pointed out, what is lost in such a mechanistic approach to the law is
that the problems of real people become “grist for the constitutional 
mill.”218 
A practical, realist approach, on the other hand, has judges decide the 
case so that the decision attempts to promote the public welfare.  Given
the inevitable conflict of interest between employee speech rights and
employer efficiency interests in these public employment free speech
cases, the constitutional balancing set out by Pickering is perfectly
suited to provide an outcome based on the specific circumstances of
different cases.  In this vein, Justice Blackmun suggested in the Rust
case that constitutional balancing of relevant interests would lead away
from a conclusion that was “insensitive and contrary to common human
experience.”219 
Rather than blindly following a neoformalist analysis, which
asks whether a formal opportunity exists in another forum to exercise 
constitutional rights, all in the service of more predictable rules, the 
realist approach of constitutional balancing is consistent with notions of 
social justice.  It is also consistent with the penalty approach to the 
213. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
214. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. 
215. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 174–75 (1991). 
216. See id. at 192–93 (“[G]overnment may ‘make a value judgment favoring 
childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public 
funds.’” (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977))). 
217. See Posner, supra note 147, at 181. 
 218. NOONAN, supra note 146, at 144 (“For the Supreme Court, proceeding as it 
appears to proceed in these [federalism] cases with an agenda, the facts are of minor 
importance and the person affected are worthy of almost no attention. . . .  The people 
and their problems that have been grist for the constitutional mill are incidental.”). 
219. One of the approaches that Justice Blackmun suggests in his dissent in Rust is 
balancing the government’s interests in promoting a certain type of family planning 
against the First Amendment rights of doctors and the Fifth Amendment substantive due 
process rights of pregnant women.  See Rust, 500 U.S. at 213–14 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
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unconstitutional conditions doctrine in requiring judges to practically
consider the actual impact that penalizing employees’ free speech will 
have on their constitutional rights.  Perhaps most importantly, it shuts the
door on the reemerging neoformalist-inspired right-privilege distinction of a
long-ago discredited age. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Neoformalism has slowly insinuated itself into the unconstitutional 
condition doctrine over the years, without many commentators noticing 
the large role it now plays in substantially reducing the constitutional 
rights of all sorts of individuals, but perhaps especially public employees. 
Through the use of the subsidy line of argument under the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions, the notion advanced by the majority in Garcetti 
is that public employee speech is nothing more than government speech
when these employees speak pursuant to their official duties.  In this
manner, neoformalism has wreaked havoc on the Pickering doctrine and 
reinvigorated the right-privilege distinction in constitutional law.  A 
formal opportunity to exercise a constitutional right is simply not the same
thing as the practical ability to exercise those rights. 
This neoformalistic approach adopted by the majority in Garcetti is 
contrary to good government.  Without the ability of public servants to 
bring to light government’s baser practices without jeopardizing their
careers, all citizens suffer from the resulting lack of government
transparency and accountability.  This is especially so at a time when it is 
harder for ordinary citizens to keep track of all the myriad departments 
that make up federal, state, and local government.  In fact, Garcetti’s
pigeonholing of public employees as mere employees does not comport
with how most employees view themselves.  Nor does it comport with 
the reality of the modern public workplace, where employee-citizens 
discuss and speak out on issues of public concern as a matter of course.
This Article therefore argues in favor of reestablishing First Amendment 
protections for public employees who speak out on matters of public 
concern.  Such employees should not have to rely on statutory whistle-
blowing or civil service protections, which may not protect their specific 
activity and which, unlike the First Amendment, may not apply to all 
levels of government and to all jurisdictions.  Instead, Garcetti’s overbroad
government speech doctrine must be limited to appropriate cases in
which employees are actually hired to transmit a specific government
message.  This necessary doctrinal transformation can be accomplished
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through a recommitment to Pickering’s penalty version of the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions, with its emphasis on constitutional balancing 
and a recognition that employees should not always have to relinquish 
vital constitutional rights in order to enjoy the benefits of public
employment.
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